
Year-End Financial & Economic Outlook for Credit Unions

#### **PRESENTED BY**

AMERICAN SHARE INSURANCE **EXCESS SHARE INSURANCE** 

# AS ES



#### **FEATURING:** Bill Hampel Speaker & Economic Consultant

Specializing in credit unions

# HOUSEKEEPING



#### **Bill Hampel**

**SPEAKER & ECONOMIC CONSULTANT** mdbhampel@gmail.com www.BillHampel.com



#### **David Kettlehake**

VP, MARKETING & SALES dkettlehake@americanshare.com www.AmericanShare.com





#### **PRIMARY SHARE INSURANCE**

#### GREATER COVERAGE

Coverage of up to \$250,000 for each and every account of an individual member

#### **NOT A REGULATOR**

We focus on safety and soundness, leaving the oversight of state laws to state regulators

#### **BUSINESS PARTNER**

One size does not fit all, allowing you to run your credit union in a way that best serves your members








# CHEERS TO TOTECTING CREDIT UNIONS



#### **EXCESS** SHARE INSURANCE



#### **O**ATTRACT



new deposits and new members

existing member deposits



members with larger deposits

# **DISCUSSION DUTLINE**

#### **Economic update**

- Recession probability
- Inflation
- Interest Rates

#### **Credit union financial implications**

- Liquidity
- Credit quality
- Earnings



# **US ECONOMY &** POTENTIAL RECESSION


The most widely forecast recession in modern history . . .

"The US economy is <u>not</u> in a recession now, but a **relatively mild** recession is likely in 2023."

*- Me* in August, 2022


Why we expected a recession:

- The inverted yield curve
- History that bringing down inflation would do serious damage to aggregate demand




#### **US ECONOMY &** POTENTIAL RECESSION

#### . . . hasn't happened




### **US ECONOMY &** POTENTIAL RECESSION






#### CPI, Trailing twelve months, 1961 to July 2022



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

myf.red/g/17P5K

Ten-year-Two-Year Treasury Spread, 1976 to July 2024



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

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# Why economists the yield curve got it wrong & what it means for the nearterm outlook

- Many "rules of thumb" have not worked in the aftermath to COVID
- Households had accumulated substantial excess savings
  - Result of strong household income during COVID
    - Most kept their jobs, worked from home
    - Government support payments for others
- Limited ability to spend because of pandemic shutdowns
- Grew to an estimated \$2.5 trillion
- Now largely depleted, except for high-income households
- Much less of a buffer against recession



# Why economists the yield curve got it wrong & what it means for the near-term outlook


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
#### **Consumers not very** "Spent Up"

#### **Real Consumer Durable Spending**

% Change, Quarterly Since 2008



#### Light Vehicle Sales Millions of Units, Annual Since 1975




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- Many "rules of thumb" have not worked in the aftermath to COVID
- Households had accumulated substantial excess savings
- Households still had "pent-up" demand vs. being "spent up"
- The mortgage rate lock meant consumers were shielded from rate increases
  - Other rate increases are having growing impact:
    - Consumer loans
    - Commercial lending roll overs
- Expected Fed reductions will likely leave consumer and mortgage rates above previous lows



**APRs on Auto Loans** at Banks, Quarterly Average **Since 2020** 



Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)

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
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- The mortgage rate lock meant consumers were shielded from rate increases
- Inflation came down faster than expected, without destroying aggregate demand





#### CPI, Trailing twelvemonths, 1961 to July 2024



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

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# **Consumer Price Index Since 2010**

Twelve-Month Percent Changes, Monthly, Latest: July 2024








### **Recent PCI Inflation**

#### Three-month moving averages: 12/20 to 7/24





# Understanding the recent inflation experience

- Inflation fell significantly and fairly quickly without a sharp economic slowdown
- If not quite "transitory" it was at least "temporary"
- The rise in inflation had three causes:
  - COVID supply chain interruptions
  - Two large stimulus programs during the pandemic (aggregate demand) Ο
  - The war in Ukraine
- Looking ahead, inflation expectations are anchored.
  - 5 year expectation: 2%
  - 10 year expectation: 2.1%






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- Inflation came down faster than expected, without destroying aggregate demand
- The job market has remained remarkably resilient



# **Non-Farm Payrolls**


#### Monthly Changes, 2006 to February 2020





# **Non-Farm Payrolls**


#### Monthly Changes SA, through July 2024





# **Monthly Non-Farm Payrolls**

#### Post COVID, Through July 2024






#### Unemployment Rate and Recessions Since 1980

Percent of the Labor Force, Latest: February 2022





### **Unemployment Rate Since COVID**








# **Initial Claims for Unemployment Insurance** (LAYOFFS)

#### 1967 to January 2020




#### September 21 to July 2024





# 


#### Job Quit Rate: Falling but Still High



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

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#### Job Openings vs. Number of Unemployed (Job Seekers)



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

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
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- The mortgage rate lock meant consumers were shielded from rate increases
- Inflation came down faster than expected, without destroying aggregate demand
- The job market has remained remarkably resilient
  - Most indicators still strong, but weakening



### Gross Domestic Product – to Q2, 2024

Excluding the second and third quarters of 2020








# **Economic Summary**

- Has the Federal Reserve defied the odds and pulled off a soft landing?
  - Slowing the economy enough to tame inflation without causing a recession.
- Or, is the economy on the cusp of a recession?
- Each view can find support in the recent data.
- Each outcome is consistent with the inverted yield curve of the past few years:
  - An inverted yield curve means investors expect interest rates to fall.
  - Either a recession or a soft landing would see rates falling.
- So, what does the Fed do?




#### **Interest Rates**

Monthly Averages 1988 to August 2024



#### **Interest Rates**

#### More Recent Focus




# **Fed Funds Rate Projections**

- Federal Open Market Committee Dot Plot (expectations, not plans):
  - Three 25 bp cuts in 2024
  - A total of 2.25% in cuts by end of 2026
  - Would mean an terminal target range of 3% to 3.25%
- Fed Funds futures market (Chicago Merc)
  - Rate down by 75 bp or 100 bp by December
- Are these cuts:
  - Soon enough to preserve a soft landing, or
  - Too little, too late, making a recession very likely?
- The weaker the economic data unfolds, the faster and larger the rate cuts, and vice versa.




# **Credit Union Loan & Savings Growth**








# Loan to Savings Ratio






# **Credit Union Delinquency**

Dollars Delinquent as Percent of Total Loans Outstanding





#### Household Debt Payments to Disposable Income




Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)



### Household Debt as Percent of

#### Disposable Personal Income







# **Credit Union Earnings**

Earnings - Basis Pts.	Q1 2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019
Yield on total assets Dividend/interest cost of	484	444	338	302	353	404
assets	184	142	52	43	70	89
Net interest margin	300	302	287	259	283	315
Fee & other income	116	112	112	136	139	140
Operating expense	295	295	286	283	302	319
Loss Provisions	55	51	25	6	50	43
Net Income (ROA)	66	68	88	107	70	93



#### **QUESTIONS?**



#### **Bill Hampel**

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Interested in learning more about Primary or Excess Share Insurance?

dkettlehake@americanshare.com









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